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WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. SAMARA BROS., INC.;1 IS THE 
EXPANSION OF TRADE DRESS LAW FAR ENOUGH? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The fact that one may copy their competitor’s trade dress without crossing 
the infringement line is a hot legal topic, creating a rivalry between brand 
name manufacturers and private label imitators as well as brand name 
companies and brand name competition.  However, decisions in the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have led to confusing and unclear guidelines in 
determining when one infringes on trade dress law.  Determining these 
standards aptly has been called “one of the most difficult analytical issues in all 
of trade dress law.”2 
First, the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Two Pesos clarified that trade 
dress will not cause infringement if it is inherently distinctive.3  However, the 
Court failed to adopt a standard to determine when trade dress is inherently 
distinctive.  This led to a variety of tests to be created by the lower circuits and 
a spectrum of differing opinions.  Next, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Bros, Inc., the Supreme Court decided product packaging can be inherently 
distinctive, but product design is never inherently distinctive.4  Even though 
the Supreme Court set forth these clear guidelines it again failed to specify a 
test to determine the meaning of inherently distinctive, nor a bright line 
difference between product design and product packaging.5 
This article first provides an overview of the development of trademark 
law and the expansion of the trade dress doctrine.  Next, the article presents the 
various tests fashioned by the lower courts to determine what exactly makes 
trade dress inherently distinctive.  Finally, this article analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores.6  The last section concludes by glancing 
at whether the Wal-Mart decision is applicable to the ever-changing 
technology of the Internet. 
 
 1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000). 
 2. Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 3. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 4. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Traditional Trademark Law 
United States trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act,7 is an exercise of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce 
Clause.  The purpose of the Act is to “secure to the owner of a mark the 
goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish 
among competing producers.”8  The Act also seeks to make “actionable the 
deceptive and misleading use of marks and to protect persons engaged in 
commerce against unfair competition.”9  While section 32 of the Lanham Act10 
protects registered marks, section 43(a)11 protects qualifying unregistered 
trademarks.  Thus section 43(a)12 of the Lanham Act creates a cause of action 
against a defendant who uses an unregistered trademark that causes a 
likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the source, sponsorship, or 
approval of its goods.13 
A trademark is defined as “any work, name, symbol or device, or any 
combination thereof used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her 
goods, including a unique product from those manufactured or sold by others 
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”14  Marks 
may be classified in the following categories of increasing distinctiveness: 
generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.15  These are often known 
as the “Abercrombie factors.”16  Marks that are deemed suggestive, arbitrary or 
fanciful are entitled to trademark protection because their “intrinsic natures 
serves to identify a particular source of a product.”17  Further, it is argued that 
trademark protection should be afforded to suggestive or distinctive terms 
which shed light upon the qualities or characteristics of goods, but which are 
not descriptive of such goods in that “an effort of the imagination on the part of 
the observer” would be required to know their nature.18 
 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998). 
 8. Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1995). 
 9. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S at 767-768 (citing Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1998)). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1998). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994); for example a commonly known mark is “Nike”, and symbol 
marks, such as Nike’s “swoosh” symbol. 
 15. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. 
 18. General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940). 
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In comparison, generic marks are those that refer to “the genus of which 
the particular product is a species.”19  Examples of generic terms include 
“aspirin” and “thermos.”20  These marks are not protectable as trademarks 
because the number of such appropriate terms is limited and all merchants 
should be equally allowed to use such terms to describe their own goods when 
competing for customers.21 
Lastly, marks that serve only a descriptive function in relation to a product 
may be protectable under trademark law as inherently distinctive.22  A 
descriptive term identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service 
such a color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients.23  Over time, a 
descriptive mark may acquire distinctiveness that allows it to be protected 
under section 2(f) of the Lanham Act.24  This type of acquired distinctiveness 
is called secondary meaning.25  Secondary meaning is established when a 
manufacturer shows that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance 
of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than 
the product itself.26 
B. Trade Dress Law 
Trade dress can be registered as a trademark with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) if the trade dress is: 1) inherently distinctive or 
has acquired secondary meaning; and 2) is non-functional.27  While trade dress 
protection is not expressly set forth in the Lanham Act, it has evolved and been 
recognized through the development of case law.28  Trade dress involves the 
total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or 
color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.29  It 
refers to the appearance of a product when that appearance is used to identify 
the producer.30  Historically, trade dress referred only to the product packaging 
 
 19. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. 
 20. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
 21. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871). 
 22. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769. 
 23. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1998). 
 25. See Rohit A. Sabnis, Product Configuration Trade Dress and Abercrombie: Analysis of 
Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 183, n.36 
(2000). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986) 
 28. See David K. Hou, Protecting Internet Trade Dress: What to do about Product 
Configuration?, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5 (1999). 
 29. John Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1883). 
 30. Publications International, Ltd. v Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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and labeling, but recently courts have expanded the term to include the total 
design of a product.31 
Some examples of trade dress held to be protectable include the festive 
décor of a restaurant,32 the shape of a Coca-Cola bottle33 and the shape of a 
book.34  There are two distinguishable categories of trade dress, product 
packaging and product configuration.35  Product packaging trade dress includes 
the total image created by the actual packaging in which a product is 
marketed.36  This is conceptually separable from the actual product.37  
However, product configuration trade dress encompasses the design or 
particular feature of the product, but the design is not separable from the 
product.38  Rather, it is part of the product itself.39 
Like trademarks, trade dress is capable of being distinctive and capable of 
being protected under the Lanham Act if it is either inherently distinctive or 
has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.40  Furthermore, the 
trade dress has to be non-functional.41  This functionality requirement prevents 
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting the goodwill 
of a source, from inhibiting competition by granting exclusive rights to a 
functional product feature.42  The aesthetic functionality doctrine further seeks 
to protect competition by recognizing that in some instances non-useful or 
decorative product features should be denied trade dress protection.43  Courts 
have recognized that in some cases, competitors need to copy strictly 
decorative product features in order to compete effectively.44  The Second 
Circuit has held that when a decorative or ornamental feature “is claimed as a 
trademark and trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by 
limiting the range of adequate alternatives, the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
denies such protection.”45 
 
 31. See Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 32. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763. 
 33. United States Trademark Reg. No. 696,147 (issued Aug. 2, 1960). 
 34. Harlequin Enters, Ltd. v. Gulf Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 35. See Margaret Barett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configuration and the Federal 
Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 475 n.15 (1998). 
 36. Id. at 475. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 769-70. 
 41. Id. at 769. 
 42. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
 43. Sabnis, supra note 25, at 189. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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While case law has covered the broad concept of trade dress, there are two 
important issues that still need to be addressed by the courts.  First, it is still 
questionable under which circumstance the features or design of a product are 
properly considered inherently distinctive.  Secondly, it is unclear what is the 
difference between product design and product packaging.  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions in Two Pesos and Wal-Mart have shed some light on 
these issues, while also creating confusion among lower courts struggling to 
answer these questions using the standards set out by the Supreme Court.46 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT: TWO PESOS 
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the split among the Court of Appeals on the question of 
whether trade dress that is inherently distinctive and therefore protectable 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act even though showing that it has 
acquired secondary meaning is lacking.47 
In 1987, Taco Cabana, a mexican restaurant chain, sued Two Pesos, a rival 
chain, claiming that Two Pesos deliberately copied Taco Cabana décor.48  Taco 
Cabana argued that the restaurant’s trade dress, a combination of nonfunctional 
features such as bright festive colors and distinctive roof design, created a 
distinctive total image for its restaurant chain.49  As a result of the distinctive 
image, Taco Cabana claimed it was entitled trademark protection under the 
Lanham Act.50  The trial court agreed and held that trade dress may include the 
shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying 
sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the décor, the menu, the equipment used to 
serve the food, the server’s uniforms and other features reflecting on the total 
image of the restaurant.51  The jury found that Two Pesos “intentionally and 
deliberately” infringed Taco Cabana’s trade dress and awarded Taco Cabana 
millions of dollars in damages.52 
On appeal, Two Pesos argued that trade dress was not capable of being 
inherently distinctive.53  Therefore, Taco Cabana should have been required to 
prove that the restaurant’s décor had acquired secondary meaning.54  Prior to 
the Two Pesos decision some courts of appeal held that trade dress was not 
capable of being inherently distinctive, and secondary meaning must be proved 
 
 46. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339. 
 47. 505 U.S. at 765. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 766. 
 52. Id. at 764. 
 53. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 763. 
 54. Id. at 766. 
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in order to afford protection.55  The Court, in an unanimous decision, held 
“trade dress that is inherently distinctive is protectable under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act without a showing that is had acquired secondary meaning.”56  
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the majority rule followed at the time by the 
Fifth,57 Seventh,58 and Eleventh Circuits59 that trade dress was capable of being 
inherently distinctive. 
By overruling the Second and Third Circuits, which had required a 
showing of secondary meaning for protection of trade dress, the Two Pesos 
Court unified the standard for trademark and trade dress law.60  As in 
traditional trademark cases, a trade dress plaintiff whose product is inherently 
distinctive can receive automatic protection without secondary meaning.  Two 
Pesos, however, did not set out a clear test as to what constitutes inherently 
distinctive trade dress. 
Although the Two Pesos decision clearly required secondary meaning in 
addition to a showing of inherent distinctiveness for trade dress protection, it 
was silent as to what constituted distinctive trade dress.61  The court 
approvingly cited the traditional Abercrombie Factors, but merely assumed that 
the Fifth Circuit was correct in holding the trade dress at issue was inherently 
distinctive.62  Although one could imply from the Court’s application of the 
Abercrombie factors that the court was approving those factors as 
determinative of trade dress distinctiveness, some post-Two Pesos circuit court 
decisions have held otherwise. 
A. Lower Court’s Interpretation of Two Pesos 
I.P. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co, decided by the First Circuit, involved 
allegations that the defendants impermissibly copied the plaintiff’s “falling 
water” faucet designs.63  Lund’s faucet was designed by noted architect Arne 
Jacobsen and received numerous design awards.64  Kohler admittedly copied 
the design and offered the faucets for sale at a lower price.65 
The First Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court that the 
Abercrombie factors did not apply and that Lund’s faucet was not inherently 
 
 55. See Vibrant Sales Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 56. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 767. 
 57. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 58. Computer Care v. Service Systems Enters. Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 59. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 60. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770. 
 61. Id. at 766-70. 
 62. Id. 
 63. I.P. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 64. Id. at 32. 
 65. Id. 
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distinctive.66  The court concluded that by rejecting the Abercrombie test as a 
means of determining inherent distinctiveness in product configurations and 
instead followed the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.67  The Seabrook Foods test was 
“whether the design, and shape of a combination of elements is so unique, 
unusual or unexpected that one can assume without proof that it will 
automatically be perceived by customers as an indicator of origin – a 
trademark.”68 
Next, the Second Circuit applied its analysis to Knitwaves, Inc. v. 
Lollytags, Ltd.69  In this case, the Second Circuit was faced with the task of 
determining “what it means for trade dress to be inherently distinctive.”70  This 
case involved the copying of plaintiff’s “squirrel” and “leaf” design appliqués 
on children’s sweaters.71  The court held that designs on children’s sweaters 
were product features and in contrast with product packaging, should not be 
analyzed for inherent distinctiveness using the Abercrombie classifications.72 
In Two Pesos the court stated that they did not intend to nullify the 
statutory definition of a trademark requiring “a person ‘use’ or ‘intend’ to use 
the mark to identify and distinguish his/her goods. . .from those manufactured 
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”73  The court found 
that the presumption of this source identifying function given to inherently 
distinctive product packaging under Abercrombie should not be extended to 
product configurations because configurations are primarily aesthetic or 
functional rather than source identifying.74  Furthermore, the court found that 
the proper inquiry for determining inherent distinctiveness is to ask whether 
product features are “likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the 
product.”75  Therefore, according to the Second Circuit “a plaintiff must do 
more than demonstrate that the appearance of its product serves some source 
identifying function.”76  It must demonstrate that the primary purpose behind 
the design was to identify its product source.77 
The Third Circuit was the first to confront the issue of what constitutes 
inherently distinctive trade dress after the Supreme Court’s decision in Two 
 
 66. Id. at 64. 
 67. Id. at 40. 
 68. I.P. Lund, 163 F.2d at 27. 
 69. Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 996 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 70. Id. at 1007. 
 71. Id. at 999. 
 72. Id. at 1009. 
 73. Id. at 1008. 
 74. Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1008. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1009, n.6. 
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Pesos in Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises.78  It sought to 
delineate when, if ever, product configurations should be deemed inherently 
distinctive.79  The case dealt with the copying of the shape and texture of a 
garden planter.80  The court, like the Second Circuit in Knitwaves, found the 
Abercrombie classifications inapplicable to determining inherent 
distinctiveness in product configurations.81  The court stated classifications for 
product features are improper because “being constitutive of the product itself 
and thus having no such dialectical relationship to the product . . .  they cannot 
be said to be ‘suggestive’ or descriptive’ of the product, or ‘arbitrary’ or 
‘fanciful’ in relation to it.”82 
In declining to adopt the classifications, the court gave two reasons why 
they should not applied to product configuration trade dress.83  First, it stated 
product configuration bears a different relationship to the product than do 
trademarks.84  Second, the court emphasized that unlike traditional trademarks, 
one cannot automatically assume that product configurations will serve as a 
source-identifying function.85  As a result, the new test formed by the Third 
Circuit was that “the product configuration must be: (1) unusual and 
memorable; (2) conceptually separable form the product; and (3) likely to 
serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product.”86 
Other circuits have derived their test from the Seabrook Foods test, but 
have not expressly adopted it.87  While, in contrast, the Fourth and the Eighth 
Circuits have expressly rejected it.88 
Recently, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue of what constitutes an 
inherently distinctive product configuration in Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. 
v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd.89  Ashley Furniture sued SanGiacomo for copying the 
design of one of Ashley’s bedroom furniture suites.90  Applying the 
Abercrombie classifications, the Fourth Circuit held that the overall appearance 
of the furniture was neither arbitrary or fanciful and therefore inherently 
 
 78. 40 F.3d 1431 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
 79. Id. at 1440. 
 80. Id. at 1433. 
 81. Id. at 1441. 
 82. Id. at 1440-41. 
 83. Duraco Products, 40 F.3d at 1440. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1434. 
 87. See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 33; Knitwaves, Inc, 71 F.3d at 1008. 
 88. See Ashley Furniture Indus., 187 F.3d at 371; Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 
780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 89. 187 F.3d at 366. 
 90. Id. 
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distinctive.91  By adopting the Abercrombie factors the court rejected the tests 
fashioned by the First, Second and Third Circuits.92 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit visited the Two Pesos analysis in Stuart Hall 
Co. v. Ampad Co.93  The Eighth Circuit sought to determine the proper test for 
determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress.94  The case questioned the 
manufacturing of specialized notebooks and pads that had graphics and text 
copied and sold at a lower price by a competitor.95  The Stuart Hall Court 
adopted the Abercrombie standards for determining inherent distinctiveness in 
all types of trade dress cases.96  According to the court, Two Pesos held that 
product configuration and product packaging should be treated uniformly.97  
Thus, the Eighth Circuit felt the Abercrombie analysis should be applied in 
both instances.98 
The circuit court conflict has important implications for trade dress 
protection.  Some thought that Wal-Mart would have clarified the issue, but the 
Supreme Court’s decision resulted in only added confusion to the area of trade 
dress law. 
IV.  THE ISSUE OF TRADE DRESS AND INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS REVISITED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Case Description of Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc.99 
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court questioned under what circumstances a 
product’s design is distinctive and therefore protectable as unregistered trade 
dress.100  This case involved Samara Brothers, Inc. which designs and 
manufactures children’s clothing, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. who is one of the 
nations best known retailers.101  Samara’s primary product lines were 
spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliqués of hearts, 
flowers, fruits and the like.102  A number of chain stores, including J.C. Penny, 
sold this line of clothing under contract with Samara.103  During that time Wal-
Mart contracted with one of its suppliers, Judy Philippine, Inc. to manufacture 
 
 91. Id. at 374. 
 92. Id. at 371. 
 93. Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 780. 
 94. Id. at 782. 
 95. Id. at 783. 
 96. Id. at 788. 
 97. Id. at 787. 
 98. Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 787. 
 99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1339. 
 100. Id. at 1341. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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a line of children’s outfits for sale in the 1996 spring/summer season.104  Wal-
Mart then sent Judy-Philippine photographs of a number of garments from 
Samara’s line.105  She made minor modifications to sixteen of Samara’s 
garments, thereby producing a line of clothing for Wal-Mart, which contained 
many copyrighted elements.106  In 1996, Wal-Mart briskly sold the so-called 
knockoffs, generating more than $1 million in gross profits.107 
However, in June of 1996, a buyer of J.C. Penny called a representative of 
Samara to complain that she had seen Samara garments on sale at Wal-Mart 
for a lower price than J.C. Penny was allowed to charge under its contract with 
Samara.108  The Samara representative told the buyer that Samara did not 
supply its clothing to Wal-Mart.109  As a result of this situation, Samara 
officials investigated the circumstances and found that Wal-Mart and several 
other major retailers, such as K-Mart, Hills and Goody’s, were selling 
knockoffs of Samara’s outfits produced by Judy-Philippine.110  In response to 
the information disclosed from the investigation, Samara sent cease and desist 
letters, none of which the companies responded.111  Then Samara brought 
action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York arguing most 
importantly, infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.112  All of the defendants, except Wal-Mart, settled before trial.113  
After a week-long trial, the jury found in favor of Samara on all claims, 
awarding Samara damages, interest, costs and fees totaling almost $1.6 
million, together with injunctive relief.114  Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied, and the Second 
Circuit affirmed.115  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.116 
The Supreme Court held in an action for infringement of unregistered trade 
dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, 
and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.117  First, 
the court looked at the requirement of distinctiveness.  In evaluating 
distinctiveness, courts have differentiated between marks that are inherently 
distinctive, marks whose intrinsic nature serves to identify their particular 
 
 104. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1341. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1342. 
 109. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1342. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1342. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1342. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1346. 
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source, and marks whose primary significance in the minds of the public is to 
identify the product’s source rather than the product itself.118  The Court found 
that product design, like color, is not inherently distinctive.119  With product 
design, as with color, consumers are aware of the reality that, almost 
invariably, that feature is intended not to identify the source, but to render the 
product itself more useful or more appealing.120 
In particular, the Court differentiated trade dress into two categories: 
product packaging and product design.121  It emphasized that product 
packaging is still capable of establishing inherent distinctiveness.122  However, 
the Court drew a bright line test for product design that the plaintiff must 
always prove secondary meaning.123  Two Pesos was distinguished since, in 
that case, the trade dress at issue was restaurant décor, which does not 
constitute product design, but rather product packaging.124  Furthermore, by 
distinguishing Two Pesos, the Court realized that the decision here might force 
courts to draw a difficult line between product design and product packaging 
trade dress.125  However, the Court stated that difficulty would be less than the 
frequency and difficulty of having to decide when a product design is 
inherently distinctive.126  The Court went even further when stating “to the 
extent there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of 
caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring 
secondary meaning.”127 
B. Author’s Analysis of Wal-Mart’s Holding. 
The Wal-Mart decision only added to the current state of confusion among 
the lower courts.  At this time, not only does the lower court have to determine 
what makes product packaging inherently distinctive; they also have to 
determine the difference between product packaging and product design. 
The Court made it clear that Two Pesos was only about product packaging.  
As a result, the controversy in the lower courts concerning whether Two Pesos 
should be applied to trade dress generally has ended.  However, the Court 
failed to specify the test for inherently distinctive for product packaging. 
 
 118. Id. at 1343. 
 119. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1334. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1345. 
 124. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1345. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1346. 
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It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court again mentioned the 
Abercrombie factors.128  More specifically, the Court held that fanciful, 
arbitrary and suggestive trade dresses are deemed inherently distinctive 
because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product.  
In this situation, the Court used the Abercrombie factors to determine what is 
inherently distinctive.129  By mentioning the Abercrombie classifications the 
Court seems to infer that the classifications are an appropriate test for 
determining whether product packaging is inherently distinctive.  However, it 
would be more appropriate if the Supreme Court would draw a bright line test.  
Since, the Court felt that the Abercrombie analysis is important in determining 
inherently distinctive trade dress, the reasoning should have specified .  Until 
the Supreme Court indicates the analysis that should be used, the lower courts 
will remain divided. 
The Supreme Court in holding that there are two categories of trade dress, 
product packaging and product design, failed to specify any criterion on which 
to make that determination.  The line between the two categories in not 
mutually exclusive.  To help resolve the issue to some extent, the Court stated 
“to the extent that there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the 
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby 
requiring secondary meaning.”130  However, as a result of this statement, 
unless the trade dress issue is apparent that it is product packaging, courts will 
always require a secondary meaning, even when one might not be necessary.  
This creates an extra burden for the party claiming infringement all the time. 
C. Is Wal-Mart Applicable to the World of the Internet? 
The two issues mentioned above are not the only two problems that arise 
out of the Wal-Mart decision.  Most importantly, the decision is not applicable 
to the ever-changing world of technology, more specifically commerce over 
the Internet.  The next section will point out in detail the inapplicability of the 
decision to the Internet.  The field of intellectual property is constantly 
growing and evolving with the great emergence of technology.  Intellectual 
property is an area of law that encounters many new controversial issues, and 
therefore must adapt to resolve such issues.  Trade dress protects consumer 
recognition of the goods and services’ source and ensures that the trade dress 
owner secures the returns on her investment in building and maintaining the 
goodwill associated with the trade dress.131  The individual designs, features, 
and identifying characteristics of goods and services, which cyberspace 
entrepreneurs offer via virtual “storefronts,” deserve similar legal protection as 
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their tangible counterparts in the physical world.132  Based on these purposes, 
there appears to be little reason for denying Internet based trade dress the same 
protection that physical goods and services’ trade dress enjoy.133  However, 
some courts’ interpretations of trade dress law, if applied to Internet 
“storefronts” without first accounting for the Internet’s unique qualities, 
suggest that trade dress protection will not be available in cyberspace, and in 
fact, may be more difficult to obtain for Internet-based products and 
services.134 
The fundamental objectives of trademark and trade dress law are to prevent 
consumer confusion and protect source identification.135  A major challenge in 
applying trade dress protection to an Internet site is the inherent variability that 
exists when a viewer visits an Internet site.136  The Internet’s variability will 
likely complicate the determination of whether consumers identify a product’s 
source through its design.  Problems arise because by its nature web sites are 
always changing, and web programmers are able to change their products 
overnight.  Within hours a business’s Internet appearance services, or manner 
of providing services can change, and within days or weeks, these aspects may 
change again.  The primary attraction of most Internet sites is that they are 
regularly updated.137  This variation can make it difficult to determine what 
constitutes the product presented to the consumer.138  The software companies 
that create Internet browsers and the Internet Service Providers continue to 
introduce new technology and update services every year, constantly altering 
the manner in which the consumer interacts and views the Internet web sites.139  
Since, the browser programs remain far from standard, one Internet site may 
present a different experience to a viewer, depending on what type of browser 
he or she uses.  An analogy can be drawn between visiting an Internet site and 
the Supreme Court’s finding in Two Pesos in which it recognized viable trade 
dress protection for “a festive eating atmosphere” presented to customers in 
several Mexican restaurants.140  Clearly, a restaurant visitor’s eating experience 
varies with locations: individual elements of the décor may be different, the 
menu may vary throughout the year, and the variations in the service of the 
employees would likely affect each visit.141  Nevertheless, the Court found that 
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the overall experience of the restaurant’s “festive atmosphere” was worthy of 
protection.142  Therefore, just as the “atmosphere” of a restaurant can 
incorporate the varying elements of the same overall experience to establish a 
valid trade dress, an Internet site should be able to incorporate “online” 
versions of these elements and create online “atmosphere” equally as deserving 
of trade dress protection.143  For example, a site may offer a different selection 
of items for sale at different times of the year, but the layout of each page, the 
organization of the site, and the overall experience of the transaction would be 
distinctive and recognizable at each separate visit.144 
Another major problem is the application of the product packaging/design 
distinction that was addressed by Wal-Mart.  Importantly, analysis of the 
distinctiveness of an Internet site may be greatly influenced by whether it is 
deemed packaging or product design.  This decision has a significant impact on 
the application of trade dress law to the Internet.  The question of whether a 
particular Internet-based product, service, or Web page constitutes packaging 
or design and, therefore, requiring a showing of inherent distinctiveness, will 
greatly impact the availability of trade dress protection for the respective item.  
Of course, it is often difficult to distinguish between a product’s packaging and 
the product itself.  While courts will make decisions based on the facts 
presented in individual cases, the best approach would seem to be an analysis 
based on the product as a whole, without an effort to separate the packaging 
from the product.  One useful example of extending trade dress protection to 
Internet sites can be found in Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame 
Straightening Equipment Inc., where the court found that the layout and 
appearance of mail order catalogue was deserving of a trade dress 
protection.145  By analogy just as a user of a catalogue experiences an overall 
impression of using a producer’s catalogue and may rely on it as an indication 
of source, so will Internet users experience and rely on particular Internet 
sites.146 
Unlike physical objects, the features of a Web-based product design cannot 
be conceptually separated from the product packaging; the features are 
inherently part of one another.147  Thus, Internet products would never give 
rise to product packaging cases.  Due to the decision in Wal-Mart any case that 
is close, courts should require a secondary meaning.  Every Internet case 
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would involve product design instead of packaging, thus requiring secondary 
meaning and the plaintiff to overcome a heavy burden. 148 
Due to the fact that Internet sites would not be able to demonstrate 
distinctiveness, in many ways, secondary meaning is at the heart of the 
underlying principles of trade dress protection.  Although the determination of 
secondary meaning generally requires a consideration of long-term consumer 
exposure to a particular product, the Internet’s variability make such 
determination difficult at best.  Factors cited as establishing secondary 
meaning include: 1) the duration and exclusivity of the design’s use, 2) the 
amount and nature of advertising that emphasizes the design and its distinctive 
features, 3) consumer survey evidence linking the design to a single source, 
and 4) the defendant’s intent in copying the design.149  Given the youth of the 
Internet as a channel of commerce, the duration of use will likely be minimal, 
exclusivity of web site features and design will also be minimal due to the 
copying and imitation existing on the Internet.150  Furthermore, the Lanham 
Act states that “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a 
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which 
the claim of distinctiveness is made.”151  Due to the fact that web site designs 
and appearances are unlikely to remain static, a requirement of five years 
continuous use is clearly inappropriate for Internet trade dress protection.  
Even if a company could establish that such a site has been in existence for 
five years, it unlikely to currently present the same “total image” to a customer 
as it did within the last two or three years.152  Most primitive Internet sites 
would not be barely five years old. Once the technology of the Internet 
becomes more standardized, companies may be able to rely on this statutory 
provision.  Until then, the case law methods of establishing secondary meaning 
will likely prevail in the area of Internet trade dress. 
The current state of trade dress law makes the protection of trade dress of 
Internet sites difficult due to the inapplicability of the product 
packaging/design distinction, as well as the Internet’s own inherent variability.  
One solution may be to relax the standards of secondary meaning, to take into 
account the characteristics of the Internet.  However, until a trade dress cause 
of action is recognized for Internet sites many courts will remain hesitant and 
confused in this area of law.  Clearly, commercial development of the Internet 
is not likely to end merely because Internet sites are not afforded trade dress 
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protection.153  However, to remain submissive on this issue may well have an 
adverse impact on the commercial development of the Internet.154 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current state of trade dress protection is still up in unclear.  There still 
exists a split among the circuits about the test to apply when determining when 
a product is inherently distinctive.  Wal-Mart court not only failed to clarify 
the issue, but also added to the confusion by making the courts determine the 
difference between product design and product packaging before applying 
some test.  The impact of the decision in Wal-Mart has yet to be experienced.  
However, it seems that only under extreme conditions will a trade dress will be 
deemed inherently distinctive.  As a result, only rarely will trade dress 
protection be available for product design and packaging.  Therefore, unless 
the current state of the law changes trade dress protection will be never be 
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